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The Test Case and Law Reform 
in the Juvenile Justice System 
by Peter R. Kolker 
Many reform-minded attorneys practicing in juvenile 
courts have sought to promote change in the juvenile justice 
system by combining the three essential ingredients needed 
to formulate a test case: determination, legal reasoning and 
In re Gault. I Too often, however, counsel have discovered 
that the conventional test case has become a less effective 
tool for reform as the juvenile courts have learned to live 
with the invasion of attorneys and due process standards 
which the Supreme Court's 1967 Gault decision produced. 
Juvenile courts have jealously guarded their prerogative to 
mete out justice unimpeded by procedural technicalities 
and have surrendered this control only with the greatest 
reluctance. Some courts have stymied test case efforts ei-
ther by intentionally blocking litigation or by undermining 
the effect of appellate decisions. 
This article explores the reaction of the juvenile justice 
system in the District of Columbia to efforts at procedural 
reform on three frontiers: (1) establishing minimum stan-
dards for the treatment accorded to pretrial detainees; (2) 
defining specific criteria governing the pretrial release of 
juveniles charged with delinquency; and (3) winning the 
right to probable cause hearings for juveniles charged with 
serious crimes. In each of these areas, experience has shown 
that attempts to bring change may be frustrated unless the 
lawyers involved carefully choose the techniques appropri-
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ate to the situation. For instance, the traditional test case 
has proved to be a less effective tool for improving pretrial 
detention conditions than for compelling a demonstration 
ofprobable cause for continued detention. In part, this is 
because the former problem is primarily one of resources 
and is thus most appropriately handled in the legislative 
domain, while the latter is a procedural question more easi-
ly solved by judicial rule-making. In part, too, the effective-
ness of test case litigation is inversely proportional to the 
ability of the juvenile justice system to resist change. Like 
most institutions, the Juvenile Court changes only when the 
pressure brought to bear upon it exceeds its capacity to 
resist, and its tactical and strategic weapons-mootness, the 
favorable disposition of a particular case to avoid general 
change, miserly application of ordered reforms-are more 
effective defenses against change in some areas than in 
others. 
This article discusses the barriers to mounting successful 
test cases, as well as some ancillary efforts which might 
increase the chances of success. It concludes with an assess-
ment of the most effective methods for achieving future 
improvements in each of these three target areas and a pro-
jection of the prospects for success. 
The Juvenile Justice System in the District of 
Columbia 
To the victim of crime, the police officer, the practicing 
attorney, the judge, the correctional personnel and-most 
of all-the juvenile respondent, the most appropriate one-
word characterization of the juvenile justice system in the 
District of Columbia has been "delay ."2 Washington is one 
of the minority of jurisdictions in which juveniles charged 
with delinquent acts are entitled to a jury trial,3 and a de-
tained youth who invokes his right may find that his case 
takes six months or longer to reach triat.4 Ifhe is released, 
his case might not come to court for more than a year. 
Even non-jury trials for detained youths have, at times, 
been backlogged for three months or more. Whether these 
inordinate delays are the product of poor court manage-
ment,5 lack of judicial and supporting manpower, increased 
court referraJs6 or a combination of these ingredients is 
problematic. Suffice it to say that the number of delin-
quency referrals to the juvenile courts has risen 42% in the 
last seven years, while the number of judges who hear the 
6,120 annual delinquency cases remains constant at three. 
Administration in the Court has advanced no more rapidly. 
The resulting backlog nas led the Court to adopt an atten-
uated approach to juvenile justice which gives short shrift 
to the needs or rights of the youths involved. In particular, 
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the pretrial phase of juvenile justice has suffered, and so the 
need to expand and buttress the rights of juveniles awaiting 
trial has become pronounced. Principally for this reason, 
but also because the juvenile justice system differs from the 
adult criminal justice system more with respect to the pre-
trial and post-adjudicative stages than to the trial itself, the 
efforts of defense attorneys in recent years have concen-
trated on the early stages of the proceedings. The future 
will likely witness an increase in litigation concerning post-
adjudicative treatment. 
Attorneys are not strangers to Washington's Juvenile 
Court; but neither are they welcomed with opened arms. 
The right to counsel for all juveniles charged with delin-
quency has been established fact since 1956.7 Yet, since 
attorneys representing juveniles tend to request their cli-
ents' full measure of legal rights, the Court has sometimes 
perceived the attorney as a champion of delay rather than 
an officer of justice. Today, relatively few youths waive 
their right to counsel. Simultaneously-and probably conse-
quently-the number of backlogged jury trial cases has risen 
sharply.8 One can hardly blame the Juvenile Court for 
looking upon the aggressive attorney as something less than 
a friend of expediency. In particular, the attorney who 
speaks of "law reform" in Court is likely to receive a cool 
welcome; his requests are viewed as new burdens on a Court 
already crushed by its own backlog. To avoid having to take 
on additional tasks, the Court has developed a series of 
defensive weapons to deflect test cases. What follows is an 
example of the Court's ability to preclude refonn by the 
use of two popular devices: first, ignoring the requested 
change until action cannot be avoided; and second, granting 
sufficient relief to prevent appellate review. 
Blocking Reform through Mootness: 
The Case of G.W. 
Since delay is such a pervasive factor in Washington's 
juvenile justice system, the place where an incarcerated 
youth is detained while awaiting trial is of considerable 
importance. Until 1968, the District of Columbia provided 
but one facility for the secure-custody detention of juve-
niles charged with delinquency. This facility, known as the 
Receiving Home, was constructed in 1948 and expanded in 
1957 to hold a capacity of9Q.9 However, increased refer-
rals, the backlog of cases and the practice of frequent pre-
ventive detention have, at times, resulted in a daily popula-
tion at the Receiving Home in excess of 160.10 Conse-
quently, in 1968 the Department of Public Welfare, which 
administers juvenile custody facilities, was forced to press 
into service a maximum-security building located on the 
grounds of its long-term commitment facilities for juveniles. 
This structure, known as the Receiving Home Annex, was 
originally designed to house those youths who had been 
adjudicated delinquent and had posed a flight problem 
while at the treatment facility. It consists of two identical 
sections, each of which houses 25 youths in single-bed cells 
8 feet by 6 feet. Each cell is furnished with a metal cot, an 
open toilet facing the cot and a washbasin. No other furni-
ture is permitted in the room, which is secured by a locked 
steel door and barred windows. 
It was to this facility that G.W., a 14-year-old youth 
charged with robbing a wrist watch by force and violence 
from a 12-year-old complainant, was remanded. Although 
G.W.'s mother had been present in Court and was willing to 
accept custody of law at the detention hearing {where the 
judge determines pretrial status), the Court concluded that 
the danger G.W. posed to the community warranted his 
pretrial detention. Since the respondent denied his partici-
pation in the offense and sought a jury trial, a lengthy peri-
od of pretrial custody was in prospect.11 It seemed clear to 
counsel that a pretrial wait of several months at the Receiv-
ing Home Annex was not likely to serve the best interests 
of the youth.12 
The District of Columbia's Juvenile Court Act requires 
the Court to furnish a juvenile who is not allowed to return 
home with the "custody, care, and discipline as nearly as 
possible equivalent to that which should have been given 
him by his parents."13 As interpreted, this mandate applies 
equally to pretrial detention and post-adjudicatory disposi-
tion.14 Measured against the statutory standard, it ap-
peared that the treatment being accorded G.W. and others 
like him fell short of the requirements. Accordingly, a mo-
tion was filed in the Juvenile Court requesting review of the 
facilities by the Court to determine whether they met the 
statutory standard. 
The Juvenile Court declined to adjudicate the merits of 
the motion, neither granting nor denying it, but simply not 
hearing it. An automatic delay of two weeks is built into 
any request for action-one week for the opponent to re-
spond and a minimum of one week for the date of the hear-
ing to be set. Here, seven weeks elapsed without any action 
from Corporation Counsel (the representative of the Dis-
trict) or the Court, notwithstanding repeated informal 
prodding. To force review, a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus was filed in the District of Maryland, the district of 
incarceration.15 Reluctant to review the merits of a claim 
arising in Washington and relating entirely to an institution 
administered by the District of Columbia, the Maryland 
District Court informally requested the Juvenile Court in 
Washington to set the matter down for prompt hearing so 
that this local concern could be settled in the jurisdiction 
with primary interest. 
The initial motion was heard some eight weeks after it 
had been filed in Juvenile Court. Representatives of the 
three Washington newspapers had_ been notified and were 
present at the hearing. Aroused by testimony and photo-
graphs offered by G.W. to show that he was not receiving 
adequate pretrial care, two of the newspapers published 
pictures of the detention facilities and an account of the 
proceeding on the front page of their city news sections. 
The stories described to the public the circumstances in 
which juveniles legally presumed innocent of any wrong-
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doing were detained. The fact that G.W.'s detention at this 
facility had already spanned nearly the entire summer was 
poignantly clear. 
Having ignored G.W.'s claim until forced to act, the Juve-
nile Court then denied G .W. relief. In addition, it acceler-
ated his trial to ensure that the transcript of proceedings on 
the pretrial motion could not be prepared before the trial 
was heardl6_a move which, in all likelihood, would pre-
clude an appeal. At his trial, G.W. was convicted of the 
charged offenses, some four and one-half months after they 
had occurred. He was then sentenced to probation, the 
"danger" he posed to the public having vanished with the 
presumption of his innocence. The effect of this disposition 
was to render moot an appeal on the issue of standards for 
pretrial detention facilities. Perhaps a class action brought 
on behalf of those incarcerated could have preserved the 
issue for appellate review even though one representative 
had obtained his release .1 7 
The establishment of standards governing pretrial deten-
tion is a problem of great moment to detained juveniles, 
who have, after all, been promised "custody, care, and dis-
cipline" during that detention.18 What the above case dem-
onstrates is the facility with which the courts can and do 
duck the issues. Always chary of telling the jailer how to 
run his business, the courts generally defer improvement of 
custodial facilities to the legislature. The weapons possessed 
by the courts-the ability to ignore pressing issues for a 
substantial period of time, the hesitancy of one court to 
force the hand of another court and the capacity to render 
moot a test case-make it comparatively easy for the courts 
to abdicate their responsibilities in this area. While appeals 
to legislatures for the resources necessary to imf rove cor-
rectional facilities are notoriously ineffective, 1 they are 
still likely to bear more fruit than litigation unless there is a 
concerted assault on the conscience of the juvenile courts 
to regulate the facilities of which they make use. 
In the meantime, G.W.'s case does point to another route 
for achieving at least some of what the judicial process can-
not or will not. The prominent publicity which the case 
engendered in local newspapers apparently embarrassed the 
Department of Public Welfare sufficiently to produce meet-
ings with defense attorneys, improvements in the educa-
tional program for pretrial detainees and additional privi-
leges for residents of the Receiving Home Annex. And near-
ly a year later, the Department implemented greatly im-
proved programs to mitigate the effects of prolonged pre-
trial detention. It seems likely that the glare of publicity 
did more to prompt these changes than did the test case 
litigation itself. The value of this ty~e of publicity to com-
plement litigation is thus apparent. O 
Standards for Pretrial Release: Victory for the 
Client, Defeat for the Cause 
A vexing problem for the attorney undertaking test case 
litigation is the conflict between the interests of his client 
and those of his cause. Of course, in all test cases the in-
terests of the client and the cause must be parallel for some 
portion of the case. Frequently, however, a development in 
the case requires counsel to press for action that will bene-
fit his client but will preclude appellate review. Likewise, as 
mentioned above, the court will occasionally grant the full 
relief requested by the client so as to destroy the test case. 
In this way, the courts are able to thwart law reform efforts 
for substantial periods of time. Illustrative of this problem 
is the case of E.R., which sought to raise to appellate review 
the constitutionality of standards governing preventive de-
tention in the Juvenile Court. 
As in most jurisdictions, pretrial detention of juveniles in 
the District of Columbia is based on criteria different from 
those applied to adult criminal defendants. 2 l Unlike adults, 
for whom bail must be fixed in every non-capital case,22 
juveniles in Washington are either released with non-finan-
cial conditions or detained absolutely.23 The detention 
may be based on factors that apply to adults-e.g., risk of 
flight-or may be ordered because the "welfare of the 
child" or the "protection of the public" is thought to re-
quire it.24 Of course, a substantial number of youths arrest-
ed are released by the police or the social worker within 24 
hours of arrest without having to appear in Court. Yet 
roughly half of those who do appear in Court for the deten-
tion hearing are remanded to custody. In a few of the cases, 
the lack of parental care or supervision is the primary rea-
son for detention; but in most, the youths are detained for 
the "protection of the public." No standards are contained 
in the statutes to explicate this phrase, and no local court 
has ever determined what the proper criteria are. The result 
is that each presiding judge has his own unarticulated and 
untested standards for determining who would be a danger 
to the public if released. 25 In essence, the Juvenile Court is 
allowed to practice what is prohibited in adult courts: pre-
ventive detention. 
The most obvious way to mount the attack on preventive 
detention is to seek appellate review of the constitutional-
ity of pretrial detention standards in current use. The ques-
tion of pretrial standards is more easily resolved in a judicial 
rather than a legislative forum, since procedural rights as 
opposed to resources are at issue. Moreover, the trend of 
legislative developments clearly indicates that Congress' 
intention is not to broaden the right to bail but to restrict 
it.26 
Having settled on judicial review as the desired goal, two 
tasks remain: selecting the proper test case and maneuver-
ing it into position so that the reviewing court can decide 
the issue. To ensure the greatest possible identity of inter-
ests between the respondent and the cause, the following 
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criteria can be used in the selection of the test case: (1) the 
youth bringing the action should have excellent pretrial 
release credentials under adult standards;2 7 (2) he should 
have a home available to him and a parent who has demon-
strated interest in exercising parental control;28 (3) he 
should be charged with a serious crime which would not be 
ignored by the prosecutor or court; and ( 4) strong evidence 
of the youth's guilt should be available to the court and 
prosecutor in order to bring the detention or release deci-
sion into sharp focus. · 
All of the above criteria appeared to have been met in the 
case of E.R. The respondent was a 17-year-old youth who 
had never previously been in trouble. He was a long-time 
resident of the jurisdiction and was living at home with his 
mother and father, both of whom were steadily employed. 
E.R. was an eleventh-grade student at a local high school, 
where he had good attendance records. He had also had a 
job and had demonstrated his reliability to his employer's 
satisfaction. These factors showed that his community ties 
were excellent and demonstrated the type of stability that 
would have made him a good candidate for recognizance 
release had he been one year older. E.R. was charged with 
armed bank robbery arising out of a spectacular, if clumsily 
executed, holdup. The strenth of the prosecutor's evidence 
was manifest, since the arrest was made moments after the 
robbery-following a high-speed chase. Shotguns and 
marked money from the bank were found in the car at the 
time of the arrest. 
In keeping with uniform Juvenile Court policy, E.R. was 
ordered detained without bond pending trial29 because a 
gun was involved in the charge. A motion requesting recon-
sideration by the Juvenile Court of the pretrial release ques-
tion was neither granted nor denied; it was not acted upon. 
The case thus appeared to be in the correct posture for 
appeaI.30 
After ten days had elapsed without judicial action on the 
pending motion, an appeal was filed with the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals,3 1 and, as required by local 
rules,3 2 the Juvenile Court was notified of that action. 
Since the issue raised in the appellate proceedings indicated 
the far-reaching importance of this case, it is safe to assume 
that the Juvenile Court was fully aware of the pending 
action. While the appeal of the pretrial release motion was 
pending, the Court held a probable cause hearing and took 
this opportunity to release the respondent. It did so in spite 
of the facts that it explicitly ruled that probable cause had 
been amply shown and that no factors militating for pre-
trial release had come to its attention since the initial deci-
sion to detain. 
What E.R.'s case demonstrates is the need for defense 
counsel of great persistence. Since the abolition of preven-
tive detention of juveniles is not likely to be achieved 
through legislation in the foreseeable future, litigation is the 
only avenue of reform. To make a dent in the Juvenile 
Court, reform-minded attorneys will have to consider treat-
ing many more routine cases as candidates for appellate 
review. Only then will the appellate courts ultimately be 
given the opportunity to endorse or veto present pretrial 
detention practice. 
Right to Probable Cause Hearing: A Successful 
Test Case and Its Limitations 
One of the most obvious injustices to face juveniles in the 
District of Columbia has been the practice of detaining 
youths (sometimes for weeks or even months) prior to trial 
solely on the basis of an unsworn police complaint. There is 
clearly a great risk of imprisoning an innocent youth on a 
baseless charge, unless a prompt evidentiary hearing is held 
to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that 
a crime has been committed and that the youth arrested has 
committed it. Although the Juvenile Court's authority to 
hold such hearings on a discretionary basis had been estab-
lished by 1967, 3 3 the Court has balked at such requests in 
all but the most unusual cases. Unwilling to saddle itself 
with additional tasks, the Court has taken the view that 
these hearings are neither required nor desirable as long as 
the police complaint accompanying the arrest describes a 
prima facie case. This approach hardly serves the youth's 
best interests, and it sets the stage for test case litigation to 
eliminate the injustice. 
As E.R.'s case amply demonstrates, the Juvenile Court is 
all too willing to moot a test case and thus maintain the 
status quo. To avoid such tactics and successfully preserve a 
case for appeal, potential test cases had to meet three cri-
teria: (1) the crime charged had to be sufficiently serious to 
assure prosecution; (2) the youth had to assert his inno-
cence; and (3) the juvenile respondent had to have a history 
of prior involvement with the Court which suggested the 
likelihood of pretrial detention based on then prevailing 
criteria. In addition, the juvenile's parents had to be willing 
to accept custody of the youth. Otherwise, legal victory 
would have resulted in a social setback: the child would 
have been set free by the Court but would have had no 
home to go to. 
Three test cases which met these standards were initiated 
simultaneously in order to ensure the vitality of the issue 
for an appellate review. Each of the three clients selected 
was advised of the proposed litigation, and each acquiesced 
in the recommendation of counsel. Two of the three youths 
were charged with burglary in the second degree; the other 
was charged with violating the Harrison Narcotics Act. Each 
requested a prompt preliminary hearing when he first ap-
peared in Court at his detention hearing. All three requests 
were denied, and petitions for writs of habeas corpus were 
immediately filed in the United States District Court. 
Prior to hearings on the petitions, two of the three cases 
changed posture. In one instance, the youth pleaded guilty 
to another pending delinquency petition. The Court then 
closed out the remaining complaints, thus rendering moot 
that youth's habeas corpus petition. In the second case, a 
death in the family prompted the juvenile authorities to 
release the youth from custody. Remaining, then, was one 
of the three original petitions, that of a 14-year-old (R.C.) 
who had had several prior involvements with the Court. 
R.C. was detained solely on the strength of the unsworn 
police complaint, which was itself double hearsay. 
At his initial hearing (arraignment) in the Juvenile Court, 
R.C. entered a denial to the charges, requested a jury trial 
and again demanded a prompt evidentiary review by the 
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Juvenile Court to determine probable cause. Since the hear-
ing on the petition for writ of habeas corpus had not been 
held by the time of the initial hearing, the Juvenile Court 
proceeded with R.C.'s case in nonnal fashion: he was re-
manded to custody to await a jury trial, although no date 
for trial had been fixed by the Court. 
To preclude mootness in the habeas action, a stay of pro-
ceedings in the Juvenile Court was requested pending the 
disposition of the habeas corpus petition.34 Subsequently, 
a hearing on the petition was held and the writ was grant-
ed.35 The District Court based its grant on the Fourth 
Amendment, holding: 
"No person can be lawfully held in penal custody by the 
State without a prompt judicial determination of probable 
cause. The Fourth Amendment so provides and this consti-
tutional mandate applies to juveniles as well as to adults. 
Such is the teaching of Gault and the teaching of Kent. " 3 6 
The District Court held that the Fourth Amendment made 
·the right to a probable cause hearing "crystal clear," and 
R.C. was shortly released from custody. Upon consultation 
with the Juvenile Court,37 the Corporation Counsel sought 
an expedited appeal. On appeal in Cooley v. Stone, 3 8 the 
ruling of the District Court was affirmed, and the right to 
preliminary hearings for detained.juveniles was established. 
Overnight, the Juvenile Court for the District of Colum-
bia, already hopelessly backlogged, faced the additional 
burden of 2,000 to 3,000 evidentiary probable cause hear-
ings.39 The Court's reaction was not enthusiastic. Some 
thought that this was understandable because, in their view, 
the court had been "doing justice" in a gross way by detain-
ing youths whose need for supervision could be inferred 
from the very fact that they had been arrested-regardless 
of the merits of the police complaints. Others were repelled 
at the prospect of adding a fourth pretrial proceeding to the 
detention, initial and motions hearings that could be ex-
pected in most cases going to trial. 
The exact impact of the Cooley decision was not clear at 
first. Were preliminary hearings required whenever request-
ed, or was detention of the youth a prerequisite? How 
much time could elapse before the hearing was held? What 
differences, if any, were relevant between juvenile and adult 
preliminary hearings? 
The Juvenile Court took advantage of this confusion by 
giving the ruling the most restrictive reading possible. Since 
the petitioner had been detained pending trial, the Court of 
Appeals' decision was frnmed with reference to detention 
cases, and the Juvenile Court promptly let it be known that 
it would apply Cooley only in such cases. True, there was 
some sense to this position, for abridgment of liberty is at 
its greatest when penal custody is in prospect. Still, defen-
dants are entitled to preliminary ·hearings regardless of their 
pretrial status.40 Nor can it be denied that a juvenile re-
leased pending trial suffers a considerable restriction of 
liberty. He is foreclosed from military service or Job Corps 
placement until the pending charges are settled. In addition, 
he lives under the shadow of the accusation-sometimes for 
a year or more. Such deprivations could clearly be regarded 
as substantial enough to bring Cooley into play. But any 
temptation the Court felt to give Cooley the more generous 
interpretation suggested by its reasoning was outweighed by 
the urge to restrict the decision's impact on an overbur-
dened court system. The limitation thus imposed on Cooley 
has apparently been endorsed by the intermediate-level 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.41 
A second essential element of Cooley which was left am-
biguous and hence easily circumvented by the Juvenile 
Court was the requirement of promptness. Under Cooley, 
the time during which a juvenile is held without a judicial 
determination of probable cause must be kept to a mini-
mum. Of course, this poses a significant dilemma for a 
court characterized throughout by delay. But since the 
Cooley decision did not fix the number of days within 
which the probable cause hearing must be held (it only 
specified that probable cause must be determined by the 
time of the initial hearing),4 2 the Juvenile Court has man.-
aged to blunt substantially the benefits of the opinion by 
holding preliminary hearings as much as six weeks after the 
arrest. By comparison, the U.S. Magistrate's Act requires 
that the analogous hearing for adult felony defendants be 
held within 10 days after arrest.4 3 Consequently, lengthy 
detention of juveniles without any determination of prob-
able cause is still common. 
Clearly, with regard to both the promptness and the avail-
ability of probable cause hearings, the Juvenile Court has 
given the Cooley decision the most restrictive interpretation 
possible and thus limited the impact of the test case. 
Conclusion 
While test cases are indispensable to an attorney who 
wants to improve the quality of justice dispensed to juve-
niles, we must recognize that the Juvenile Court-no less 
than any other entrenched institution-will resist change to 
its full capacity. And as the three cases set forth above am-
ply demonstrate, the Court has both the will and the way 
to resist incursions on its established procedures. To be suc-
cessful, any litigator needs to have a comprehensive picture 
of his adversary, whether it be General Motors, the driver of 
a colliding vehicle or the juvenile justice system. Cases must 
be planned with reference not only to legal arguments but 
also to the anticipated moves of the opponent. In the case 
of Juvenile Court test litigation, this means that clients 
should meet the social and legal criteria necessary to ensure 
preservation of the case for review by the appellate court. 
But test case litigation is only one tool to promote 
change, since only some of the multitude of sins of the 
juvenile justice system are amenable to change through the 
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courts. Procedural reforms are much more likely to be en-
acted by the courts than by the legislatures; at least in the 
present political climate. Reforms that require money, how-
ever, are likely to fall on deaf judicial ears. The courts sim-
ply cannot command the resources required to achieve the 
changes sought, and few will attempt to compel improve-
ments in correctional institutions if they have no funds to 
implement their edicts. 
Appeals to the legislatures can be aided by the litigating 
attorney. Not only can he lobby directly ifhe has access to 
legislators, but he can also bring to public attention the 
existence of conditions which require change and which 
embarrass the institutions responsible for these conditions. 
Enlisting the aid of the press to cover a court proceeding 
(provided that it does not jeopardize a client's right to a fair 
trial) is a tactic which should be practiced in conjunction 
with many test cases. As the case ofG.W. shows, this ap-
proach by itself may bring success where legal devices have 
failed. 
The last ten years have brought dramatic changes in the 
juvenile justice system. However, iflawyers continue to rely 
on the traditional test case as the major vehicle of reform, 
the pace of such change is likely to slow considerably. As 
the cases described in this article show, the courts have 
learned to respond to threats of change with all the many 
resources at their command, and in large part, their re-
sponse has been successful. As long as reform-minded law-
yers continue to play the game wholly by their adversaries' 
rules, no different outcome can be expected. Substantial 
changes can only be expected if attorneys push hard for 
change at every limit and employ such extra weapons as 
press coverage and legislative pressure. 
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4. Committee on the Administration of Justice in the District of 
Columbia, A Study of the Juvenile Court for the District of Colum-
bia 30 (1969). 
5. Report of the President's Commission on Crime in the District 
of Columbia 677-680; 728-731 (1966) (hereinafter referred to as 
"D.C. Crime Commission Report"). See also Committee on the Ad-
ministration of Justice in the District of Columbia, A Study of the 
Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia 40, 115 (1969). 
6. 1969 Annual Report of the D.C. Juvenile Court 39 (Table 4) 
(1969). 
7. Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F. 2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 
1956). It is worth pointing out, however, that prior to Gault, the 
right was scarcely taken advantage of. Eighty-five to ninety per cent 
of the juveniles entitled to counsel were waiving assistance according 
to the D.C. Crime Commission's Report at 682. Now the statistics 
are just the opposite. 
8. As of the end of the fiscal year 1969, some 290 cases were 
awaiting jury trial, an increase in the backlog of more than 800 per 
cent since 1966. By comparison, the Court tried 28 jury cases in 
fiscal 1969, according to the 1969 Annual Report of the D.C. Juve-
nile Court, supra at 9, 17. 
9. For a description of the Receiving Home facility and program, 
see D.C. Crime Commission's Report at 642. 
10. In July, 1970, the Department of Public Welfare took adminis-
trative steps to limit the Receiving Home's population to 105. The 
excess population is housed at the commitment facilities in quarters 
separate from the general commitment population's. 
11. See A Study of the Juvenile Court for the District of Columbia, 
supra at 40, for a description of pretrial delay. Based on surveys of 
1969 detention cases, the report concludes that seven months' delay 
for a jury trial in a detention case is not uncommon. Due to admin-
istrative changes in 1970, however, the pretrial delay appears to be 
diminishing. 
12. Not only was the physical setting of the Receiving Home Annex 
likely to cause G.W. serious discomfort, but the fact that he was 
detained at the commitment facility 2 5 miles from the city made it 
more difficult for him to receive family visitors. In addition, in 
1969, the facility's program consisted of 10-12 hours per day of 
confinement in a locked room, most of the balance being spent in a 
recreation room in front of the television set. Exercise in an asphalt 
yard was permitted for an hour or two per day, and once a week, 
swimming was allowed. During the summer months, no education 
program was offered at the facility; during the school year, educa-
tion consisted of remedial work for two and a half hours per day. 
The public schools of the District do not recognize this work as 
fulfilling school requirements, and no credit is given for it. The facil-
ity had no programs in psychiatric therapy, job training or social 
counseling. 
13. 16 D.C. Code§ 2316. 
14. The right to petition the courts for improved juvenile treatment 
facilities under 16 D.c; Code § 2316 was firmly established by 
Creek v. Stone, 379 F. 2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967), and In re Elmore, 
382 F. 2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967). This line of cases has made the Dis-
trict of Columbia undoubtedly more progressive than other jurisdic-
tions in this area, although cases relating to juvenile treatment facili-
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15. Althou~h the traditional reading of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 requires a 
habeas petitioner to bring his action in the district in which he is 
incarcerated, Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), the trend of 
more recent decisions favors applying a forum-of-convenience analy-
sis to determine where the action should be filed. See Word v. North 
Carolina, 406 F. 2d 353 (4th Cir.) (1969). The District Court for 
the District of Columbia preferred to rely on the traditional Ahrens 
v. Clark approach and declined jurisdiction in G.W.'s case. The 
Maryland District Court, being bound by the Word decision, was 
inclined to send the case back to Washington as the forum with 
most interest in the outcome. 
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1.6. In the Juvenile Court, unlike criminal courts, the court report· 
ers are salaried by the Court and are not permitted to receive com-
pensation for transcripts. There is, therefore, little inducement for a 
court reporter to prepare transcripts quickly; in fact, the Court in· 
structs reporters as to which requests for transcripts should be 
honored and in what order. 
17. See Fed. R. Civ. P., R. 23(b) (2); Singleton v. Board of Commis· 
sioners, 356 F. 2d 771 (5th Cir. 1966); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. 
Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966). 
18. Creek v. Stone, 379 F. 2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
19. Cf Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, No Man is an Island, 56 
A.B.A.J. 325 (April, 1970). 
20. As in most jurisdictions, unauthorized disclosure of information 
pertaining to a juvenile under the Court's jurisdiction is a misde-
meanor. 11 D.C. Code § I 586. Also, the American Bar Associa-
tion's Standards Relating to Fair Trial & Free Press, § I .I (1969) 
prohibits pretrial disclosure of information that might prejudice a 
client's case. Neither provision precludes pretrial publicity that re-
lates to the institution rather than the individual, however. 
21. For a comprehensive discussion of pretrial detention practices 
relating to juveniles, see S.H. Mora, Juvenile Detention: A Constitu-
tional Problem Affecting Local Government, I Urban Lawyer 189 
(Summer, 1969). 
22. 18 u.s.c. § 3146. 
23. Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F. 2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967), holds that 
money bail should not be set for juveniles since the D.C. Code pro-
vides an "adequate substitute" for the adult money bail system 
through its expressed preference for recognizance release. The Juve-
nile Court either releases or detains a juvenile, but it does not, with 
a few rare exceptions, condition release on the posting of a cash 
bond. 
24. 16 D.C. Code§§ 2306, 2308. 
25. Cf Statement of Prof. Alan M. Dershowitz, Hearings Before the 
Senate Subcommittee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. lst Sess. at 
172-9 (1969). 
26. See P.L. 91-358 (July 29, 1970), providing for preventive de-
tention of adult criminal defendants in Washington on grounds of 
future dangerousness, 84 Stat. 644. 
27. The Bail Reform Act of 1966 lists the following as factors to be 
considered by the judicial officer fixing pretrial release conditions: 
the nature of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against 
the accused, the accused's family ties, employment, financial re-
sources, character and mental condition, the length of residence in 
the community, his record of appearance at court proceedings or of 
flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings. 
18 u.s.c. § 3146{b). 
2 8. Although a youth can object to pretrial detention from a penal 
setting such as the D.C. Receiving Home, an objection to preventive 
detention is much more appealing when voiced by a respondent 
with a roof over his head and a parent at the door. Appellate courts, 
no Jess than trial courts, are loath to open the locked door of a de-
tention center if the youth released will have to spend the night on 
the street. 
29. See note 23, supra. 
30. Fulwood v. Stone, supra, prescribes the procedure to be fol-
lowed by a juvenile seeking review of his pretrial release status. It 
holds that habeas corpus is not the appropriate method of review 
until the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (the intermediate 
appellate court) has had the opportunity to consider the Juvenile 
Court's ruling. 
31. For purpose of appeal, the failure of the Juvenile Court to act 
on the review motion was treated as a denial of the motion, since 
the result was the same. 
32. D.C.C.A. (Civ.), R. 18. 
33. Rice v. District of Columbia, 385 F. 2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
Cf In re Judge Ketcham, unpublished opinion No. 2773, District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals, July 9, 1964, granting writ of prohibi-
tion to prevent a probable cause hearing. 
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2251. Note that no stay of proceedings was re-
quested in E.R. 's case, with the result that the Court was able to 
avoid appellate review. The reason is that 28 U.S.C. § 225 I only 
allows a stay when a habeas action is pending in a District Court, 
while E.R. sought review of a motion in the D.C. Court of Appeals. 
35. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
Habeas Corpus No. 98-69. 
36. Unpublished opinion of Judge Gerhard A. Gessell, United 
States District for the District of Columbia, Habeas Corpus No. 
98-69, decided May 27, 1969, quoted in Cooley v. Stone, 414 F. 2d 
1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
37. 11 D.C. Code§ 1583(a) defines the role of Corporation Coun-
sel in juvenile proceedings. He is to "assist" the Court upon "re-
quest," a role perhaps analogous to that of general counsel to a cor-
poration. Cf Rice v. District of Columbia, 385 F. 2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 
1967). 
38. Cooley v. Stone, supra. 
39. Approximately 49 per cent of the 6,100 delinquency cases are 
estimated to result in some pretrial detention. 
40. F.R. Crim. P., R. S; Magistrate's Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3060(b). 
41. In Re Taylor, _A. 2d __ (slip op. No. 4979, decided March 
31, 1970). 
42. Cooley v. Stone, supra at 1214. 
43. 18 u.s.c. § 3060{b). 
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